The gravity of foreign news coverage in the EU: does the euro matter? by Fracasso, Andrea et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The gravity of foreign news coverage in
the EU: does the euro matter?
Andrea Fracasso and Nicola Grassano and Giuseppe Vittucci
Marzetti
University of Trento, University of Sussex, University of
Milano-Bicocca
May 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55930/
MPRA Paper No. 55930, posted 20. May 2014 18:02 UTC
The gravity of foreign news coverage in the EU:
does the euro matter?
SIS Working Paper N o 2014–5
May 2014
Andrea FRACASSO
University of Trento
Nicola GRASSANO
University of Sussex
Giuseppe VITTUCCI MARZETTI
University of Milano-Bicocca
School of International Studies
via Tommaso Gar, 14
38122 Trento – ITALY
http://www.unitn.it/ssi
The gravity of foreign news coverage in the EU:
does the euro matter?
Andrea Fracasso
School of International Studies;
Department of Economics and Management; University of Trento
Nicola Grassano
SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex;
Knowledge for Growth Unit, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS)
Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti∗
Department of Sociology ad Social Research, University of Milano-Bicocca
Abstract
This work investigates the systemic factors behind cross-country variability in
the transnational media coverage of foreign news in the EU in 2010. Using a
large dataset on the transnational coverage of news by 148 EU national media,
the paper maps the network of EU transnational citations and performs a
quantitative assessment of their systemic determinants via the estimation of a
gravity model of news. Nine empirical hypotheses are tested. Size and economic
development of the target (source) country are positively (negatively) associated
with the probability of coverage. Historical, linguistic and economic ties increase
this probability. The evidence on the effect of the countries’ participation in the
currency union is weak: once the historical levels of trade integration and the
effects of the sovereign debt crisis are accounted for, there is no robust evidence
of a higher integration of the media spheres within the euro area.
Key words: Complex networks, European Union, Eurozone, Gravity model,
Media sphere.
JEL Classification: C210, F330, F500, F690, Z100
∗Corresponding author: Department of Sociology ad Social Research, University of Milano-
Bicocca, via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi 8, 20126 Milan, Italy Phone: +39 0264487457, Fax:
+39 0264487561
Email addresses: andrea.fracasso@unitn.it (Andrea Fracasso),
n.grassano@sussex.ac.uk (Nicola Grassano), giuseppe.vittucci@unimib.it (Giuseppe
Vittucci Marzetti)
Preprint submitted to JCMS May 9, 2014
1. Introduction
The establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union is the most advanced
form of economic integration observed so far in the European Union (EU). It
has brought about a wide range of far-reaching changes in member countries,
both at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, as shown by the vast
literature aimed at assessing the impact of the common currency on the Euro
Zone (EZ) (e.g. Rose, 2000; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; Baldwin and Taglioni,
2007; Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013).
Likely, the adoption of the euro has also affected public debates, pushed
further the transformation of the national public spheres, and modified the
orientation of foreign news coverage. Sharing the same currency area raises
the likelihood and the size of cross-border economic and political spillovers,
increases the interdependence among countries, and fosters the importance of
common actions (or lack thereof). Even short of creating a community of fate,
EZ countries become more interdependent because of the very fact of sharing the
same currency, central bank, exchange rates, and the like. Thus, events in EZ
member states acquire greater salience for the remaining EZ members. In fact,
when the euro was established, this strengthening of the economic integration
was generally viewed, in particular by the European federalists, as a way to foster
political and social integration, including the Europeanization of the national
media spheres.1
Although plausible, the hypothesis that the European news coverage has
been affected by the EZ membership has not been empirically tested yet. While
the literature has already addressed how the national media presented (and
added to) the debate on the euro (e.g. Werder, 2002; Brettschneider et al.,
2003), there exists a gap concerning whether and how journalism responded
to the modification of the political and institutional environment following the
process of monetary integration. In other words, if and to what extent there is a
euro-related dimension of journalism and media communication.
Taking stock of previous quantitative works on the determinants of foreign
news, we analyse the “systemic determinants” (Wu, 2000) of the international
news coverage in the European press and, in particular, the impact of the EZ
membership on transnational coverage. The systemic factors under investigation
(both national traits and measures of relatedness, such as population, economic
development, physical distance, trade, common language and historical linkages)
are those identified in previous quantitative studies (see, among the others, Wu,
2000; Bru¨ggemann and Kleinen-von Ko¨nigslo¨w, 2009); to this set of factors we
add the main variable of interest, i.e. EZ membership, and a few dichotomous
variables to capture crisis-related sources of newsworthiness in the period under
investigation (in line with Galtung and Ruge, 1965).2 Of the alternative forms
1Greater foreign news coverage within the EZ could also facilitate the achievement of what
economists call an “optimum currency area” (see, for instance, Frankel and Rose, 1998).
2We do not address all the possible individual and societal determinants of foreign news
value, the factors affecting the organization and the mission of each of the journals in the sample
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of Europeanization of public communication discussed in Koopmans and Erbe
(2004) and Sifft et al. (2007), this work addresses neither European-wide mass
media (often associated with the idea of a supranational public sphere, as
in Firmstone, 2008a) nor the coverage of EU-related news by national media
(known as vertical Europeanization) (e.g. De Vreese, 2001). Rather, following
the distinction between horizontal and vertical Europeanization put forward by
Koopmans and Erbe (2004), the analysis focuses on horizontal Europeanization,
that is on the communicative linkages among the EU member states. For this
reason, to describe and to analyse the news-related cross-country linkages we
adopt complex empirical approaches able to account for bilateral relationships,
respectively network analysis and a gravity model of news, recalling the gravity
model of trade (e.g. Head and Mayer, 2014). The latter is an empirical framework
that relates bilateral trade flows between any pair of countries to country-specific
factors — such as the “economic mass” of the trading countries, measured in
terms of their GDP — and pair-specific variables — such as the geographical
distance. Instead of assessing the determinants of bilateral trade flows, in this
work we investigate the determinants of bilateral cross-country coverage of foreign
news. The candidate country- and pair-specific determinants we test will be
chosen by following both previous studies and intuition.
This paper exploits a unique dataset on the transnational coverage of stories
related to other EU member states by 148 EU national newspapers. The
paper contributes to the debate on European economic and media integration
in two ways. First, given the number of news media and articles considered,
it presents a comprehensive transnational coverage network in the EU, and
draws a quantitative assessment on the systemic factors affecting the horizontal
Europeanization of the European media sphere. Second, with respect to previous
longitudinal newspaper studies, it adopts up-to-date empirical methods able to
capture the common traits of the observed bilateral news-related linkages in the
EU, thereby explaining the cross-country variability in the ways in which EU
countries cover news regarding other EU countries. Third, by means of robust
estimation methods, this work tackles whether journalists and editors working
in EZ countries show relatively greater interest in what happens in their EZ
partners than in what occurs in other EU members.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the
data on the transnational coverage of national media in EU member states. In
Section 3, we draw on and analyse the weighted directed network of citation
probabilities in the national media for EU member states. In Section 4, we
identify nine systemic factors that might exert influence on international news
coverage and derive nine hypotheses to test; then, we present the gravity model
of news adopted to assess the factors behind the observed structure of citation
(as done in smaller scale studies, such as Firmstone, 2008b; Bru¨ggemann and Kleinen-von
Ko¨nigslo¨w, 2009, 2013), the barriers to effective coverage of foreign news (such as the logistic
factors analysed in Wu, 2000), and the journalists’ personal responses to the emergence of a
EZ dimension (as done in interview-based studies like Statham, 2008; Firmstone, 2008b).
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probabilities. Section 5 presents the main empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
To evaluate quantitatively the extent to which EU member states are covered
by the media of other EU partners, it is first necessary to draw a homogeneous
sample of news articles published in the EU. This work follows that done by
Economisti Associati (2011) and covers all the articles (1.96 million) published
between 16 August and 15 November 2010 by the major general and business
newspapers in the EU countries and collected by the database Meltwater News
(http://www.meltwater.com/products/meltwater-news/).3
Following Bru¨ggemann and Kleinen-von Ko¨nigslo¨w (2009), we focus mainly
on the most influential daily national newspapers in each country, although the
sample includes also a number of very influential regional newspapers (e.g. La
Vanguardia and La Voz de Galicia in Spain) and weekly magazines (e.g. Le
Nouvel Observateur in France, Der Spiegel in Germany, and The Economist in
the UK).4 Compared to Bru¨ggemann and Kleinen-von Ko¨nigslo¨w (2009), our
dataset has the advantage of covering all the EU countries, while it has the
disadvantage of a limited time span, though this is not a reason for concern
given the “horizontal” focus of our research.
As in Bru¨ggemann and Kleinen-von Ko¨nigslo¨w (2013), we measure foreign
news coverage in terms of the presence of references to foreign EU countries in
articles published in EU national media. References to foreign EU countries are
sought in the title and body of every article through search strings containing the
name of the target countries (translated into various languages) (see Economisti
Associati, 2011, for details). This does not allow to look at the quality of coverage
and to distinguish editorials from regular articles, events and political quotes,
and the like.5 Although we reckon that looking at the content and specific
sources of the coverage would provide further useful insights, we focus here on
the extent of cross-country media coverage.
Once aggregated by nationality of origin, the total number of articles referring
to each target country is divided by the total number of articles published in the
3The dataset was developed and released by Economisti Associati in the framework of a
feasibility study for the preparatory action “Erasmus for journalists” commissioned by the
DG Information Society of the European Commission, and implemented by a consortium led
by The Evaluation Partnership and involving the European Journalism Centre. The research
team responsible for the statistical review was led by Tommaso Grassi. The final report is
available on the European Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/
media_taskforce/doc/mobility/erjo_part2_report.pdf.
4The sources are generalist or business newspapers. Sport newspapers and infotainment
tabloids are not included. The full list of newspapers can be found in Annex D of Economisti
Associati (2011). The selection criteria are described in details in Annex C of the same report.
5For instance, we cannot distinguish journalists’ references to EU partners from politicians’
declarations about foreign countries, as done in Statham and Koopmans (2009). The citations
are not weighted for the journals’ copies, readers or market shares. Since we do not assess the
impact of journal’s foreign coverage on the domestic public opinion, this normalization is not
necessary.
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source country; this will normalize the measure for the country-specific number
of outlets and articles per outlet. Given any ordered pair of countries (i, j), the
unit of analysis, pij , is therefore the fraction of articles in the source country
i referring to the destination country j among all the articles published in i;
this can be conceived as the probability that an article published in i refers to
j. These figures are employed directly in the creation of the weighted directed
network of transnational media coverage illustrated in Section 3.
In the empirical estimates (Sections 4 and 5), we use instead the logistic
transformation of pij , logit(pij) = log
(
pij
1−pij
)
, i.e. the log of the odds in
favour of picking an article referring to j randomly choosing among all the
articles published in i. In the various specifications to test the determinants of
the transnational media coverage in the EU, we make use of both continuous
and dichotomous variables, chosen in accordance with previous findings in the
literature and with the hypotheses to test. The continuous variables include:
the average population of the (source and target) countries over the period
2001-2010, from Eurostat; the average 2001-2010 GDP per capita in PPP, from
Eurostat; the bilateral weighted distances, from CEPII; the bilateral trade flows
as a fraction of the total international trade flows of the source country averaged
over 1999-2000, from Eurostat; the average long-term interest rates over the
period August-November 2010, from the ECB; the political orientation of the
countries, from the 2010 Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2012).
3. The transnational coverage network in the EU
The most direct and self-illustrative approach to analyse the transnational
media coverage in the EU is to represent the citation probabilities pij between the
27 countries as a weighted directed network (see, among the others, Barthe´lemy
et al., 2005; Boccaletti et al., 2006). The nodes (or vertices) of the network are
the 27 EU member states, each link (or arc) (i, j) represents the citations of j
made by articles published in i with a weight given by pij .
The resulting network is plotted in Figure 1. In the graph, link thickness and
darkness are proportional to the weights (pij). The node size is proportional
to the average in-weight, i.e. the average of the weights attached to incoming
links, a measure of the importance of the country as a target. Node position is
determined by two main forces: nodes were initially plotted according to the
geographical position of the correspondent country, as determined by the capital
city coordinates, and then moved by an algorithm that brings the nodes that
are particularly strongly connected closer together.6
An inspection of the network reveals that it is characterized by heterogeneous
relationships (for some descriptive statistics and a more formal exploratory
analysis see the Appendix). Four dimensions of heterogeneity can be appreciated.
6The plot is made using Pajek 3.09 and applying the Kamada-Kawai algorithm. See
Batagelj et al. (2011) for details on Pajek and further references on force-directed algorithms
for drawing graphs.
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First, EU countries differ in their being the target of others’ citations as shown
by the size of the node, proportional to their average in-weight. The average in-
weight ranges from 0.00202 for Malta to 0.05042 for Germany. Among the most
covered countries, Germany is followed by France (0.04965), the UK (0.03414),
Italy (0.03270), and Spain (0.02759). Thus, countries differ greatly in their
attraction of news, a feature that could be defined as “gravitational pull”, for
reasons that will be clearer in the next section. Node size is proportional to
the average in-weight: intuitively, countries’ population is a likely determinant
of foreign citations as large countries tend to be ceteris paribus in the news
relatively more than small countries do. However, other factors contribute to
make a country an interesting target of foreign media (we shall investigate the
relative impact of these factors in the following sections).
Second, in the graph the UK is much closer to continental Europe than in
the real planisphere, meaning that the continental media pay attention to what
happens in the UK and vice versa. On the other hand, Scandinavian countries
and the Central and Eastern states occupy a relatively marginal role in the
continental press.
Third, EU countries differ in terms of the total number of citations to EU
partners and this appears to be negatively associated with country size: the
largest countries exhibit a high presence in foreign EU press, but a rather low
propensity to cite other countries. The average of the weights attached to
outgoing links (average out-weight), a measure of the country’s coverage of the
other EU countries, ranges from 0.00772 for Italy to 0.02634 for Luxembourg.
Among the least covering countries, Italy (0.00772) is followed by the Netherlands
(0.00859), Germany (0.00915), France (0.00930), and Spain (0.00944). This
notwithstanding, the variance across countries in the level of coverage of other
states is rather limited, suggesting that the imbalances between countries as
targets of transnational media coverage are larger than those for countries as
“producers” of transnational news.7
Fourth, while some countries concentrate their foreign citations to only a few
partners (e.g. Cyprus toward Greece, Luxembourg toward France and Germany,
Ireland toward the UK), others exhibit more uniformly distributed citations (e.g.
Latvia, Hungary and Slovenia).
This heterogeneity is certainly not unexpected: the interest shown by the
national media for news regarding EU partners depends not only on bilateral-
specific factors (such as common language, history, etc.), but also on source
country- and target country-specific determinants. The very same fact that the
network is far from symmetric — as documented by the relatively low reciprocity
(0.43 on a 0 to 1 scale, see the Appendix) — despite the relevance of symmetric
determinants, such as geographical distance, suggests that country-specific factors
play an important role in shaping the network. All this indicates that various
factors may lie behind the actual structure of the network: the next section will
7Average in-weights dispersion is greater than average out-weights dispersion: the coefficient
of variation in the former (latter) is 0.864 (0.346).
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be devoted to illustrating the hypotheses to test and the empirical approach.
4. Methodology
4.1. Hypotheses
Previous quantitative works on foreign news coverage (e.g. Wu, 2000; Bru¨gge-
mann and Kleinen-von Ko¨nigslo¨w, 2009) indicate that the “eliteness” of a country
(population size and level of economic development, here measured by the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in PPP) is associated positively with the
probability of being covered by foreign media and negatively with the probability
of covering foreign news. This represents the first hypothesis (H1) we test. The
literature also indicates that physical and linguistic distance reduces foreign
news, and this hypothesis (H2) will also be tested in our sample.
The existence of a euro-related dimension of transnational news coverage will
be then analysed: the hypothesis to test is that foreign news coverage among
members of the EZ is relatively more intense (H3). The economic literature
on the impact of the euro on other variables has revealed the risk of spurious
correlations: if the countries participating in the EZ are those naturally more
interconnected, one could attribute to the EZ membership what is in fact the
effect on foreign coverage of particularly strong trade ties. For this reason we
test the relevance of a variable capturing historical trade links (H4) and check
whether this addition changes our findings about the hypothesis H3.
Subsequently, borrowing on news value theory, we test whether events con-
nected with the idea of “conflict” are news factors. In particular, we test whether
Ireland and Greece were particularly covered because of their financial and
economic conditions, as well as their resort to EU and intergovernmental loans
(H5). Admittedly, Ireland and Greece are not the only countries experiencing
some financial distress in the second half of 2010. To capture the intensity of
such pressure we employ the long-term interest rates, which reflect the perceived
country risk: the hypothesis is that the higher the sovereign bond yields (and
the spreads vis-a-vis the German bunds), the larger the transnational media
coverage of the countries in trouble. This is an alternative version of H5, say
H5-bis.
It is known that international political meetings tend to attract media
coverage: this is relevant in our study as the larger countries in the EZ may have
received greater coverage because of their participation in G8 meetings (one
was held in Canada in June 2010). Moreover, an important meeting between
the French President Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Merkel took place in
Deauville in October 2010: the two leaders released a joint Declaration about
their engagement for a revision of the EU treaty as a way out of the crisis. We
test whether a “meeting” effect can be detected in our sample (H6).
To check the robustness of the previous result, it is important to consider the
fact that also historical and cultural linkages, not just the economic ones, can
strengthen foreign coverage. Accordingly, we test whether bilateral news coverage
is positively affected by the existence of historical ties (H7), and we focus on
8
Comecon countries, Baltic countries, Ireland and the UK, Czech Republic and
Slovakia.
Finally, we posit that there might be a relationship between a country’s
political position and the national media’s attitude towards foreign news. Thus,
we investigate whether the left-right ideological position of the parties in power
in each country has an impact on the bilateral news coverage (H8). As long as
journal articles cover national political speeches and party positions, a systematic
relationship between the parties’ ideological position and foreign coverage could
emerge, in line with the idea that national actors contribute to shape the conflict
constellation and thus influence news value (Adam, 2007). Finally, the impact
of the ideological position of the parties in power about European integration
will be assessed (H9).
4.2. The gravity model of news
The very fact that previous studies indicate that economic and population
mass, as well as distance, impact on the bilateral news coverage suggest inves-
tigating the determinants of the strength on bilateral citations by estimating
a specification that closely resembles a gravity model of trade (e.g. Rose, 2000;
Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007; Disdier and Head, 2008; Head and Mayer, 2014).8
This allows to control for several factors at the same time, thereby overcoming
the statistical limitations of those analyses that account for one variable at a
time. As we shall show, this is particularly important for the main hypothesis we
test (H3), that is that the participation of the source and destination countries
in the EZ is conducive to higher than otherwise citations.
The baseline specification of the gravity model of news can be written as
follows:
logit(pij) = β0 + β1 logPopi + β2 logPopj + β3 logGDPPCi+
+ β4 logGDPPCj + β5 logDistij + β6 Lanij + γ Z + ij (2)
where the logit of pij (see Section 2) is regressed on: a constant; the log of
the average population (Pop) of the source (i) and target (j) country; the logs
of the average GDPs per capita in PPP (GDPPC) of the source and target
country; the log of the weighted geographical distance between the two countries
(Dist);9 a dummy equal to one if the two countries share a common official
8The basic version of the gravity model of trade can be written as follows:
logXij = α0 + α1 logGDPi + α2 logGDPj + α3 logDistij + ij (1)
where the (log) exports from country i to country j (Xij) are a log-linear function of the
countries’ GDP and the geographical distance (Distij), plus a constant (α0) and an error term
(ij). α1 and α2 measure the elasticity of trade to the GDP of the source and destination
country. α3 measures the elasticity of trade to distance.
9We use the weighted distances (distwces) from the CEPII database (www.cepii.com):
distances calculated using city-level data to account for the geographic distribution of population
inside each nation in 2004 (see Mayer and Zignago, 2006, for details). Results do not significantly
change with the other measures of distance in the dataset, nor do they change by using a
dummy to identify neighbouring countries.
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language and zero otherwise (Lan).10 As in Wu (2000) and Bru¨ggemann and
Kleinen-von Ko¨nigslo¨w (2009), these variables allow to test H1 and H2: β1 and β3
are expected to be negative, β2 and β4 are expected to be positive (H1), and β5
negative and β6 positive (H2). To this specification, we add other variables to test
the remaining hypotheses and to check the robustness of previous findings: Z is
a vector of additional variables that are added to test the remaining hypotheses.
The first variable we introduce is a dummy variable equal to one if both
countries are in the EZ and zero otherwise (euro). This is added with a view
to answering the main empirical question of this work: is there evidence of
a euro-related dimension in the transnational coverage by the national media
within the EU? This amounts to asking whether the coefficient of the dummy
variable euro is statistically greater than zero. We shall then tackle alternative
specifications to refine the analysis.11
5. Results
The estimation of the baseline specification (Model I in Table 1) yields results
consistent with the literature and with the prima facie evidence provided by the
visual inspection of the network in Section 3. The larger and more developed a
country, the more likely it is cited by media in other countries and the less likely
it is to cite other countries.12 In sum, the hypothesis H1 is not rejected by the
data.
A second result is that the less distant the countries, the higher the proba-
bility of a citation. Similarly, sharing the same official language increases this
10When β1 = β3 and β2 = β4, Equation (2) simplifies to
logit(pij) = β0 + β1 logGDPi + β2 logGDPj + β5 logDistij + β6 Lanij + γ Z + ij
which closely resembles Equation (1). Moreover, some specifications of the gravity model
include GDP per capita in addition to GDP, although this functional form does not emerge
from any well-known theoretical model of international trade (Disdier and Head, 2008).
11All the coefficients in (2) can be consistently estimated via OLS. However, since some of
the regressors are at the country level and the errors are likely to be correlated within country,
the usual OLS standard errors might greatly underestimate the true variance (Moulton, 1990).
We therefore compute standard errors clustered at the source country level and report them
in Table 1. Unfortunately, this decreases the test power. Therefore, we discuss also the test
statistics calculated using the usual OLS standard errors, which are almost always smaller
than the cluster-robust ones.
12To appreciate the parallel with the gravity model of trade, note that our dependent variable
is (a monotonic transformation of) the fraction of articles in i citing j over all the articles
produced in i. In a trade model, something similar is obtained by rearranging Equation (1) as
follows:
log
Xij
GDPi
= β0 + (β1 − 1) logGDPi + β2 logGDPj + β3 logDistij + ij (3)
where the dependent variable is now the fraction of goods exported in j on the total goods
produced in i. When the elasticity of trade to GDP is less than one, the coefficient attached
to the GDP of the source country in Equation (3) turns out to be negative.
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probability. This is evidence in favour of hypothesis H2.13
The likelihood that EZ members cite other EZ members simply qua users of
the same currency are, ceteris paribus, higher than otherwise. If the media of
EZ members offer a relatively higher transnational coverage of news about other
EZ members, we do not reject hypothesis H3, that is that there is a euro-related
dimension in the transnational media coverage.
The euro dummy, however, could pick up the effect of other omitted variables,
related to the participation in the EZ and to foreign coverage. For instance, if
countries adopting the euro are those historically more integrated from a trade
viewpoint, the dummy euro could simply proxy for historical preferential ties. To
explore this hypothesis, we introduce in the estimation an additional regressor:
the gross bilateral trade (export plus import) between countries i and j over total
trade flows of country i. To limit the problems connected with the endogeneity
of trade and monetary integration and to emphasize the historical traits of
cross-country trade relationships, the variable is calculated as an average over
the years 1999-2000.14 The new estimates (Model II) suggest that the inclusion
of this variable is appropriate as it reduces the risk of attributing the effects of
historically strong trade relationships to the participation in the EZ. All the
explanatory variables but euro are statistically significant at the 1% significance
level. On the contrary, euro has a lower coefficient (0.0884), which is statistically
greater than zero only at the 10% level (one-sided p-value = 0.080).15
These findings, in line with the results in Wu (2000), suggest that H4 cannot
be rejected and that previous conclusions on H1 and H2 are robust to the
introduction of historical trade links among the explanatory variables. The
impact of EZ membership on news coverage is positive and slightly significant,
and H3 is not rejected. These results should be treated with care. First, we do
not interpret these partial correlations in terms of causality. Second, we need to
proceed further with the analysis to check whether these findings are robust to
further changes in the estimated specification.
As anticipated, we test hypothesis H5 by including two dummies to account
for the peculiar financial events in Greece and Ireland in 2010 (Model III).
Besides testing H5, this represents a robustness check on previous results on
H3: it is possible that the extraordinary exposure of these two countries to the
attention of other EU members due to their financial problems drives the results
about the significance of the euro variable in the previous specifications. Indeed,
the estimate of the effect of euro in Model III further decreases (0.054) and
13Results are similar with the alternative measure of linguistic affinity from CEPII, i.e. a
dummy equal to one if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both countries.
14Had we been using 2010 trade data, we would not have accounted for the effect of the
currency union on the transnational coverage produced by the increased trade integration
generated by the currency union itself.
15It is worth noting that the introduction of the new explanatory variable also affects the
point estimates of all the other coefficients. This is not surprising given the fact that the GDPs
of any pair of countries, as well as their geographical distance, are strongly correlated with the
size of bilateral trade flows. It follows that the trade variable subsumes part of the effects of
these variables.
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becomes not statistically greater than zero at the 10%.16
The hypothesis H5bis, a more general version of H5, can be tested via a more
general approach to account for the different extent to which EU countries were
exposed to the sovereign debt crisis (Model IV). We use a specification that,
instead of the dummies for Greece and Ireland, includes a continuous variable
with the average value of the long-term interest rates (percentage points) in the
target country during the period of observation (August-November 2010).17 The
estimated coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically significant: the
higher the sovereign bond yields, the larger the transnational media coverage
within the EU. Once the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis is taken into
account, the data does not seem to provide empirical support to the hypothesis
H3 that EZ membership strengthens news coverage (the parameter of euro is
not statistically greater than zero at the 10% level).18
We now consider a hypothesis suggested by news value theory: larger countries
in the EZ may receive greater coverage because of their participation in G8
meetings and other formal and informal international fora. In particular, a very
important meeting that received great media coverage took place in Deauville in
October 2010 between the French President Sarkozy and the German Chancellor
Merkel. Model V in Table 1 reports the estimates of a specification like Model
III, but including a dummy that takes the value of one if the target countries
belong to the G8, and a dummy equal to one when Germany and France are
the target countries. The estimated coefficients of these variables are positive
and significant, so that H6 is not rejected by the data.19 Moreover, we include
a set of dummies for those pairs of countries that are integrated for historical
(non-euro-related) reasons: a dummy equal to one if the two countries are Baltic
states and zero otherwise; a dummy equal to one if the two countries belonged to
the Comecon; a dummy taking the value of one if the two countries are the Czech
Republic and Slovakia; a dummy equal to one if the two countries are Ireland
and the UK.20 All these dummies appear positive, as expected, and statistically
significant, providing evidence in favour of the hypothesis H7. The estimate of
the coefficient of euro decreases further (0.037) and is not statistically greater
than zero (one-sided p-value = 0.210 using the usual OLS standard error).
To check the robustness of these findings, in Model VI we add the long-term
interest rate of the target country to Model V. The dummies identifying the
coverage of Greece and Ireland lose their significance, while all the remaining
variables keep their sign, size and significance. This is in line with the idea
16The coefficient is not statistically greater than zero at the 10% level even using the usual
OLS standard errors (one-sided p-value: 0.129).
17Due to the lack of comparable data for Estonia, the sample contains only 674 observations.
18We also estimated quantile regressions to look for significant effects of the euro on some
conditional quantile of logit(pij). All the conditional quantiles were not statistically different
from the conditional mean and the euro dummy was never statistically significant.
19Given that the GDP per capita and population are included in the specification, the G8
dummy variable is not capturing economic size, but an effect that adds to it.
20We also included a dummy for any pair among Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg,
but it was not statistically significant and was thus omitted.
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that it was the financial turmoil that made these (and a few other) countries
particularly newsworthy.21 Model VII shows the results when the long-term
interest rate is included and the previous dummies are excluded. As before,
the participation of the source and target countries in the EZ does not appear
associated with higher odds of citation (once again the coefficient of euro is not
statistically greater than zero at the 10% level, even using the usual OLS s.e.,
one-sided p-value = 0.144).
Finally, in Models VIII and IX we explore the relationship between a country’s
political position and the national media’s attitude towards foreign news. To do
so we use the 2010 Chapel Hill expert surveys dataset, including estimates of
party positioning on European integration and ideology issues for national parties
in various European countries (Bakker et al., 2012). We calculate the position of
the parties in power in each state by taking the simple average of all the party
position values attributed to the parties forming government coalitions in late
2010. In Model VIII, we look at the general left-right ideological position starting
from the experts’ attribution of values on a 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right)
scale. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the
10% level, thus suggesting that in conservative countries the media tend to be
less interested in covering foreign news, in line with H8. In Model IX, we look
at the ideological position of the parties in power about European Integration,
starting from the experts’ attribution of values on a 1 (strongly oppose) to 7
(strongly in favour) scale. We find a positive but not statistically significant
coefficient, which indicates that there does not seem to be evidence in favour of
H9.
6. Conclusions
Exploiting a new dataset on the transnational coverage by 148 EU national
newspapers of stories related to other EU member states, this paper analyses
the coverage network in the EU. The analysis uncovers a large cross-country
heterogeneity both in the source and target countries. The representation of the
network of bilateral transnational media coverage in the EU allows us to make
a preliminary visual assessment and draw some clues about the determinants
of such heterogeneity. Geographical distance, among the bilateral factors, and
country size, among the country-specific factors, appear as likely sources of
the observed variation. On this basis and taking stock of previous studies on
both foreign news coverage and news value theory, we identify nine systemic
factors that might exert influence on international news coverage and derive
nine hypotheses regarding the bilateral cross-country media coverage in the EU.
The econometric analysis, which builds on the gravity model of trade, provides
21The dummy “to Ireland” remains significant at the 10% only because standard errors are
clustered at the source country level, and the variable is constant at the target country level.
If we cluster standard errors at the level of the target country, the dummy loses its significance
(s.e. = 0.231, p-value = 0.489).
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more precise findings on the determinants of foreign coverage and more robust
evidence on the nine hypotheses (H1 to H9) we test.
From the analysis some evidence emerges in favour of the existence of a
gravity model of news, where country size and economic development of the
target (source) country are positively (negatively) associated with the odds of
observing news regarding the target country in the media of the source country
(H1 and H2). Moreover, historical, linguistic and economic ties (this latter
proxied by the relative strength of bilateral trade linkages) increase the odds of
transnational coverage (H4 and H7). The political attitude of the incumbent
governments is also significantly related to the odds of foreign citations (H8),
and being conservative is associated with lower transnational coverage.
Moreover, in line with news value theory, we find that countries participating
in international meetings (i.e., G8 and Deauville in 2010) attract the attention of
foreign media, as also do those countries which are involved in events associated
with the idea of “conflict” (i.e., the sovereign debt turmoil in 2010) (H5 and
H5bis).
As to the main hypothesis in this study (i.e. H3), we do not find robust
evidence that the media in EZ member states show relatively greater interest for
what happens in other EZ partners than for what occurs in EU members not
participating in the EZ. Indeed, some prima facie evidence suggesting relatively
stronger links among EZ countries is not robust across the various specifications.
In fact, once the historical levels of trade integration and the country-contingent
positions in the recent sovereign debt crisis are accounted for, the null hypothesis
of no systematic difference in coverage probabilities between EZ members and
the other EU countries cannot be rejected. From a methodological viewpoint,
this warns against adopting parsimonious specifications in the estimation of the
systemic determinants of foreign news coverage, as done in previous works.
We do not venture into either the debate about the impact of the media on
European integration (see European Commission (2006) and Trenz (2008) among
others) nor into the vexed questions regarding the relationship between the media
and the creation of a European public sphere (see Peters et al. (2005), Sifft et al.
(2007), Pfetsch (2008), and Koopmans and Statham (2010) for qualitative and
quantitative analyses of the issue, and Meyer (2010) for an historical perspective)
nor on the alleged communication deficit in the EU (Meyer, 1999). However, our
findings seem to suggest that non-economic integration among the EU countries
sharing the same currency is not relatively stronger than that among the other
EU states. Deeper economic integration does not seem to strengthen per se the
newsworthiness of events occurring in other countries within the EZ and the
horizontal Europeanization of the national media spheres.
Nonetheless, we suggest using great care in the interpretation of these results.
To the extent that trade and monetary integration processes are affected by
common determinants, our findings could be interpreted as signalling the lack
of an impact on transnational media coverage arising from the participation of
countries in the EZ in addition to that already implied by the relatively higher
level of economic integration characterizing the EZ member states. Similarly,
while it is true that Greece and Ireland did receive extraordinary coverage
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mainly because at the centre of the turmoil in the sovereign debt markets, it
is their participation in the EZ that made the discussions about their bail-out
so politically tense and the spillovers of the situation so far reaching. These
observations suggest that the understanding of the “ordinary”, so to speak,
determinants of EU bilateral transnational coverage would benefit from repeating
the analysis when the economic and financial tensions in the EZ will ease.
Finally, it is worth stressing that although the analysis falls exclusively on the
horizontal dimension of the Europeanization of the national media spheres, we do
not suggest that an “Europeanization aloof from the EU”, to use Bru¨ggemann and
Kleinen-von Ko¨nigslo¨w’s (2009) words, is the only pattern of Europeanization at
work (and worth investigating). In this work we do not “measure” and compare
the various patterns of Europeanization of national media spheres, as done in
Sifft et al. (2007) and Bru¨ggemann and Kleinen-von Ko¨nigslo¨w (2009), for two
main reasons: first, we did not monitor national media’s references to the EU
and the EZ; second, the gravity model of news is appropriate to cover only
bilateral coverage. It is well possible that the introduction of the euro did not
promote grater media coverage of foreign news among the EZ member states,
but at the same time it increased the vertical dimension of the Europeanization
of the national media spheres, for instance through greater coverage of EU and
EZ institutions and bodies (e.g., the ECB and the Eurogroup) by the national
media. The investigation of this issue will be the object of future research.
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A. Exploratory weighted network analysis
The EU transnational coverage network, plotted in Figure 1, is fully described
by the 27×27 weights matrix W = {pij}, with pii = 0. The network is complete.
The 702 (27×26) weights pij are approximately log-normally distributed. The
summary statistics are reported in Table 2. The maximum (minimum) is 0.18225
(0.00043) and it corresponds to the probability of Greece (Malta) appearing in
articles published in Cyprus (the Netherlands).
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of common network measures: in-
strengths and out-strengths,22 inward and outward node disparities, and cluster-
ing coefficients (see Barthe´lemy et al., 2005; Boccaletti et al., 2006).
As shown by Figure 2(a), there is a clear negative linear correlation between
log out-strengths and log in-strengths: the more important a country is as a
target, the lower its propensity to cite other countries.
The degree of heterogeneity in foreign citations for each country can be
assessed by looking at node disparity. Since the network is directed, both inward
and outward disparities are computed. Node outward disparity is the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index of the weights attached to outgoing links.23 The average
22The in-strength of node i is the sum of the weights of the links directed toward i:
si =
∑
j pij . As such, the in-strength is proportional to the average in-weight. In a similar
manner, the out-strength, i.e. the sum of the weights attached to outgoing links, is proportional
to the average out-weight.
23The outward disparity of node i is
∑
j (pij/si)
2, where si is the out-strength of i (Boccaletti
et al., 2006, p.199)
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Obs
weights 0.0150 0.0183 0.0086 0.0004 (NL,MT) 0.1823 (CY,GR) 702
in-strengths 0.3910 0.3376 0.2626 0.0526 (MT) 1.3110 (DE) 27
out-strengths 0.3940 0.1352 0.3624 0.2008 (IT) 0.6849 (LU) 27
outward disparity 0.0863 0.0235 0.0820 0.0628 (LV) 0.1803 (CY) 27
inward disparity 0.0779 0.0456 0.0565 0.0439 (DE) 0.2049 (LV) 27
clustering coefficient 0.0589 0.0128 0.0541 0.0428 (CY) 0.0909 (DE) 27
(a) log in-strength vs. log out-strength (b) log in-strength vs. log clustering coefficient
Figure 2: Scatter plots (with least squares fit)
outward disparity in the network is 0.0863 (Table 2). The highest disparities
occur in Cyprus (0.1803), Luxembourg (0.111) and Italy (0.1054); the lowest in
Latvia (0.0628), Hungary (0.0632) and Slovenia (0.0637).
Likewise, node inward disparity is the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of in-
coming link weights. The nodes characterized by the highest inward disparities
are Latvia (0.2049), Estonia (0.1794) and Lithuania (0.1597). The lowest are
Germany (0.0439), Spain (0.0442) and the Netherlands (0.0444).
As for the clustering coefficient, since the network is weighted and directed,
we compute the clustering coefficient following Fagiolo (2007), who adapts
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to directed networks the index used in weighted undirected networks.24 The
resulting average clustering in the normalized network is 0.0589 (Table 2), with a
coefficient of variation of 0.217. The highest clustering happen to be in Germany
(0.0909), France (0.0890) and the UK (0.0820); the lowest in Cyprus (0.0428),
Malta (0.04343) and Slovenia (0.0483). As shown by Figure 2(b), there is a clear
positive linear correlation between (the logs of) clustering and in-strength.
Finally, we look at the degree of reciprocity, i.e. the tendency of node pairs to
form mutual connections. We measure reciprocity by adapting a measure used in
the literature for binary directed networks to the weighted case, i.e. the number
of bi-directed arcs on the total number of arcs in the network (e.g. Newman
et al., 2002). We compute the reciprocity index as follows:
R =
∑
i,j 6=i min(pij , pji)∑
i,j 6=i pij
The index is bound between 0 (no reciprocity) and 1 (perfect reciprocity). In
our network it is 0.43.
24We normalize the weights matrix, W¯ = W/max({pij}), and compute the clustering
coefficient of node i as follows:
Ci =
[(
W¯[
1
3 ] + W¯T [
1
3 ]
)3]
ii
2
(
dtoti (d
tot
i − 1)− 2d↔i
)
where, at the numerator, [X]ii stands for the (i, i) element of a generic matrix X, X
[ 13 ] for the
cube root element-by-element of X, XT for the transpose of X; at the denominator, dtoti is
the total degree of node i, i.e. the number of in-going and out-going links of i, and d↔i is the
number of bilateral links between i and its neighbors (Fagiolo, 2007, p. 3). Since our network
is complete, we have:
2
(
dtoti (d
tot
i − 1)− 2d↔i
)
= 2 (2(n− 1)(2(n− 1)− 1)− 2(n− 1)) = 8(n− 1)(n− 2)
where n (= 27) is the number of nodes. The normalization of W changes the value of the
coefficients, but not the resulting order of the nodes in terms of clustering.
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